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Shareholder rights vary across firms.  Using the incidence of 24 governance rules, 
we construct a “Governance Index” to proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 
1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest 
decile of the index  (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest decile of the index 
(weakest rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the 
sample period. We find that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, 
higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate 
acquisitions.   
 
   
 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, shareholder rights, investor protection, agency 
problems, entrenched management, hostile takeovers, poison pills, golden parachutes, 
greenmail.   1
I.  Introduction 
Corporations are republics. The ultimate authority rests with voters (shareholders). These 
voters elect representatives (directors) who delegate most decisions to bureaucrats (managers).  
As in any republic, the actual power-sharing relationship depends upon the specific rules of 
governance.  One extreme, which tilts toward a democracy, reserves little power for management 
and allows shareholders to quickly and easily replace directors.  The other extreme, which tilts 
toward a dictatorship, reserves extensive power for management and places strong restrictions on 
shareholders’ ability to replace directors. Presumably, shareholders accept restrictions of their 
rights in hopes of maximizing their wealth, but little is known about the ideal balance of power. 
From a theoretical perspective, there is no obvious answer.  In this paper, we ask an empirical 
question -- is there a relationship between shareholder rights and corporate performance? 
  Twenty years ago, large corporations had little reason to  restrict shareholder rights.  
Proxy fights and hostile takeovers were rare, and investor activism was in its infancy.  By rule, 
most firms were shareholder democracies, but in practice management had much more of a free 
hand than they do today.  The rise o f the junk bond market in the 1980s disturbed this 
equilibrium by enabling hostile-takeover offers for even the largest public firms. In response, 
many firms added takeover defenses and other restrictions of shareholder rights. Among the most 
popular were those that stagger the terms of directors, provide severance packages for managers, 
and limit shareholders’ ability to meet or act.  During the same time period, many states passed 
antitakeover laws giving firms further defenses against hostile bids.   By  1990, there was 
considerable variation across firms in the strength of shareholder rights. The takeover market 
subsided in the early 1990s, but this variation remained in place throughout the decade.   2
  Most research on the wealth impact of takeover defenses uses event-study methodology, 
where firms' stock returns are analyzed following the announcement of a new defense.
1  Such 
studies face the difficulty that new defenses may be driven by contemporaneous conditions at the 
firm, i.e., adoption of a defense may both change the governance structure and provide a signal 
of managers' private information about impending takeover bids. Event studies of changes in 
state takeover laws are mostly immune from this problem, but it is difficult to identify a single 
date f or an event that is preceded by legislative negotiation and followed by judicial uncertainty.  
For these and other reasons, some authors argue that event-study methodology cannot identify 
the impact of governance provisions.
2  
  We avoid these difficulties by taking a long-horizon approach.  We combine a large set of 
governance provisions into an index which proxies for the strength of shareholder rights, and 
then study the empirical relationship between this index and corporate performance.  Our 
analysis should be thought of as a “long-run event study”: we have democracies and 
dictatorships, the rules stayed mostly the same for a decade -- how did each type do? Our main 
results are to demonstrate that, in the 1990s, democracies earned significantly higher returns, 
were valued higher, and had better operating performance.  Our analysis is not a test of market 
efficiency.  Because theory provides no clear prediction, there is no reason that investors in 1990 
should have foreseen the outcome of this novel experiment.  Also, because this “experiment” did 
not use random assignment, we cannot make strong claims about causality, but we do explore the 
implications and assess the supportive evidence for several causal hypotheses.
3 
                                                 
1 Surveys of this literature can be found in Bhagat and Romano [2001], Bittlingmayer [2000], Comment and 
Schwert [1995], and Karpoff and Malatesta [1989].  
2 See Coates [2000] for a detailed review of these arguments. 
3 Other papers that analyze relationships between governance and either firm value or performance have generally 
focused on board composition, executive compensation, or insider ownership [Baysinger and Butler 1985, Bhagat 
and Black 1998, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999, Hermalin and Weisbach 1991, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
1988, Yermack 1996].  See Shleifer and Vishny [1997] for a survey.     3
Our data are derived from publications of the Investor Responsibility Research Center.  
These publications provide 24 distinct corporate-governance provisions for approximately 1,500 
firms since 1990.
4  In Section II, we describe these provisions and data sources in more detail. 
We divide the  rules into five thematic groups and then construct a “Governance Index” as a 
proxy for the balance of power between shareholders and managers.  Our index construction is 
straightforward: for every firm, we add one point for every provision that reduces shareholder 
rights.  This reduction of rights is obvious in most cases; the few ambiguous cases are discussed. 
Firms in the highest decile of the index are placed in the “Dictatorship Portfolio” and are referred 
to as having the “highest management power” or  the “weakest shareholder rights”; firms in the 
lowest decile of the index are placed in the “Democracy Portfolio” and are described as having 
the “lowest management power” or the “strongest shareholder rights”.   
In Section III, we document the main empirical relationships between governance and 
corporate performance.  Using performance-attribution time-series regressions from September 
1990 to December 1999, we find that the Democracy Portfolio outperformed the Dictatorship 
Portfolio by a statistically significant 8.5 percent per year.   These return differences induced 
large changes in firm value over the sample period.    By 1999, a one-point difference in the 
index was negatively associated with an 11.4 percentage-point difference in Tobin’s  Q.   After 
partially controlling for differences in market expectations by using the book-to-market ratio, we 
also find evidence that firms with weak shareholder rights were less profitable and had lower 
sales growth than other firms in their industry.   
                                                 
4 These 24 provisions include 22 firm-level provisions and six state laws (four of the laws are analogous to four of 
the firm-level provisions).  For the remainder of the paper, we refer interchangeably to corporate governance “laws”, 
“rules”, and “provisions”.  We also refer interchangeably to “shareholders” and “investors” and refer to 
“management” as comprising both managers and directors.   4
The correlation of the Governance Index with returns, firm value, and operating 
performance could be explained in several ways. Section IV sets out three hypotheses to explain 
the results.  Hypothesis I is that weak shareholder rights caused additional agency costs.  If the 
market underestimated these additional costs, then a firm’s stock returns and operating 
performance would have been worse than expected, and the firm’s value at the beginning of the 
period would have been too high. Hypothesis II is that managers in t he 1980s predicted poor 
performance in the 1990s, but investors did not.  In this case, the managers could have put 
governance provisions in place to protect their jobs. While the provisions might have real 
protective power, they would not have caused the  poor performance.  Hypothesis III is that 
governance provisions did not cause poor performance (and need not have any protective power) 
but rather were correlated with other characteristics that were associated with abnormal returns 
in the 1990s.  While we cannot identify any instrument or natural experiment to cleanly 
distinguish among these hypotheses, we do assess some supportive evidence for each one in 
Section V. For Hypothesis I, we find some evidence of higher agency costs in a positive 
relationship  between the index and both capital expenditures and acquisition activity.   In support 
of Hypothesis III, we find several observable characteristics that can explain up to one-third of 
the performance differences. We find no evidence in support of Hypothesis II.  Section VI 




   5
II. Data 
 
A.  Corporate-Governance Provisions 
 
Our main data source is the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which 
publishes detailed listings of corporate-governance provisions for individual firms i n  Corporate 
Takeover Defenses [Rosenbaum 1990, 1993, 1995, and 1998].   These data are derived from a 
variety of public sources including corporate bylaws and charters, proxy statements, annual 
reports, as well as 10-K and 10-Q documents filed with the SEC. The IRRC’s universe is drawn 
from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 as well as the annual lists of the largest corporations in 
the publications of  Fortune,  Forbes,  and  Businessweek.   The IRRC’s sample expanded by 
several hundred firms in 1998 through additions of some smaller firms and firms with high 
institutional-ownership levels.  Our analysis uses all firms in the IRRC universe except those 
with dual-class common stock (less than 10 percent of the total).
5  The IRRC universe covers 
most of the value-weighted market: even in 1990, the IRRC tracked more than 93 percent of the 
total capitalization of the combined New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX), and Nasdaq markets.    
The IRRC tracks 22 charter provisions, bylaw provisions, a nd other firm-level rules plus 
coverage under six state takeover laws; duplication between firm-level provisions and state laws 
yields 24 unique provisions.   Table I lists all of these provisions and Appendix A discusses each 
one in detail.  We divide them into five groups:  tactics for delaying hostile bidders ( Delay); 
voting rights ( Voting); director/officer protection ( Protection); other takeover defenses ( Other); 
and state laws (State).   
                                                 
5 We omit firms with dual-class common stock because the wide variety of voting and ownership differences across 
these firms makes it difficult to compare their governance structures with those of single-class firms.     6
The  Delay group includes four provisions designed to slow down a hostile bidder.   For 
takeover battles that require a proxy fight to either replace a board or dismantle a takeover 
defense, these provisions are the most crucial.  Indeed, some legal scholars argue that the 
dynamics of modern takeover battles have rendered all other defenses superfluous [Daines and 
Klausner 2001, Coates 2000].  The  Voting group contains six provisions, all related to 
shareholders’ rights in elections or charter/bylaw amendments.  The  Protection group contains 
six provisions designed to insure officers and directors against job-related liability or to 
compensate them following a termination.  The  Other  group includes the six remaining firm-
level provisions.   
These provisions tend to cluster within firms.  Out of (22 * 21)/2 = 231 total pairwise 
correlations for the 22 firm-level provisions, 169 are positive, and 111 of these positive 
correlations are significant.
6 In contrast, only nine of the 62 negative correlations are significant.  
This clustering suggests that firms may differ significantly in the balance of power between 
investors and management. 
The IRRC firm-level data do not include provisions that apply automatically under state 
law.  Thus, we supplement this data with state-level data on takeover laws as given by Pinnell 
[2000], a nother IRRC publication.  From this publication, we code the presence of six types of 
so-called “second-generation” state takeover laws and place them in the State group.
7  Few states 
                                                 
6 Unless otherwise noted, all statements about statistical significance refer to significance at the five-percent level. 
7 These laws are classified as “second-generation” in the literature to distinguish them from the “first-generation” 
laws passed by many states in the 60s and 70s and held to be unconstitutional in 1982. See Comment and Schwert 
[1995] and Bittlingmayer [2000] for a discussion of the evolution and legal status of state takeover laws and firm-
specific takeover defenses.  The constitutionality of almost all of the second-generation laws and the firm-specific 
takeover defenses was clearly established by 1990. All of the state takeover laws cover firms incorporated in their 
home state.  A few states have laws that also cover firms incorporated outside of the state that have significant 
business within the state.  The rules for “significant” vary from case to case, but usually cover only a few very large 
firms.  We do not attempt to code for this out-of-state coverage.   7
have more than three of these laws, and only Pennsylvania has all six.
8  Some of these laws are 
analogues of firm-level provisions given in other groups.  We discuss these analogues in Section 
II.B.   
The IRRC dataset is not an exhaustive listing of all provisions.  Although firms can 
review their listing and point out mistakes before publication, the IRRC does not update every 
company in each new edition of the book, so some changes may be missed.  Also the charter and 
bylaws are not available for all companies and thus the IRRC must infer some provisions from 
proxy statements and other filings. Overall, the IRRC intends its listings as a starting point for 
institutional investors to review governance provisions.  Thus, these listings are a noisy measure 
of a firm’s governance provisions, but there is no reason to suspect any systematic bias.  Also, all 
of our analysis uses data available at time t to forecast performance at time t+1 and beyond, so 
there is no possibility of look-ahead bias induced by our statistical procedures. 
  To build the dataset, we coded the data from the  individual firm profiles in the IRRC 
books.  For each firm, we recorded the identifying information (ticker symbol, state of 
incorporation) and the presence of each provision.   Although many of the provisions can be 
made stronger or weaker (e.g., supermajority thresholds can vary between 51 and 100 percent), 
we made no strength distinctions and coded all provisions as simply “present” or “not present”.  
This methodology sacrifices precision for the simplicity necessary to build an index.   
For most of the analysis of this paper, we match the IRRC data to the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) and, where necessary, to Standard and Poor’s Compustat database.  
CSRP matching was done by ticker symbol and was supplemented by handchecking names, 
exchanges, and states of incorporation. These procedures enable us to match 100 percent of the 
                                                 
8 The statistics of Table I reflect exactly the frequency of coverage under the default law in each state.  A small 
minority of firms elect to “opt-out” of some laws and “opt-in” to others.  We code these options separately and use 
them in the creation of our index.     8
IRRC sample to CRSP, with about 90 percent of these matches having complete annual data in 
Compustat. 
 
B.  The Governance Index 
 
The index construction is straightforward: for every firm, we add one point for every 
provision that restricts shareholder rights (increases managerial power).  This power distinction 
is straightforward in most cases, as is discussed below.  While this simple index does not 
accurately reflect the  relative impacts of different provisions, it has the advantage of being 
transparent and easily reproducible. The index does not require any judgments about the efficacy 
or wealth effects of any of these provisions; we only consider the impact on the balance of 
power.   
For example, consider Classified Boards, a provision that staggers the terms and elections 
of directors and hence can be used to slow down a hostile takeover. If management uses this 
power judiciously, it could possibly lead to an increase in overall shareholder wealth; if 
management uses this power to maintain private benefits of control, then this provision would 
decrease shareholder wealth.  In either case, it is clear that Classified Boards increase the power 
of managers and weaken the control rights of large shareholders, which is all that matters for 
constructing the index.   
Most of the provisions can be viewed in a similar way.  Almost every provision gives 
management a tool to resist different types of shareholder activism, such as calling special 
meetings, changing the firm’s charter or bylaws, suing the directors, or just replacing them all at 
once.  There are two exceptions: Secret Ballots and Cumulative Voting.   A Secret Ballot, also 
called “confidential voting” by some firms, designates a third-party to count proxy votes and   9
prevents management from observing how specific shareholders vote.  Cumulative Voting 
allows shareholders to concentrate their directors’ votes so that a large minority holder can 
ensure some board representation.  (See Appendix A for fuller descriptions.)  These two 
provisions are usually proposed by shareholders and opposed by management.
9  In contrast, none 
of the other provisions enjoy consistent shareholder support or management opposition; in fact, 
many of these provisions receive significant numbers of shareholder proposals for their repeal 
[Ishii 2000].  Also, both Cumulative Voting and Secret Ballots tend to be negatively correlated 
with the presence of other firm-level provisions (19 negative out of 21  for Cumulative Voting; 
11 out of 21 for Secret Ballot).  Thus, we consider the presence of Secret Ballots and Cumulative 
Voting to be increases in shareholder rights.  For each one, we add one point to the Governance 
Index when firms do not have it. For all other provisions, we add one point when firms do have 
it.
10 
Thus, the Governance Index (“G”) is just the sum of one point for the existence (or 
absence) of each provision.  We also construct subindices for each of the five categories:  Delay, 
Protection, V oting, Other, and State.  Recall that there are 28 total provisions listed in the five 
categories, of which 24 are unique. For the state laws with a firm-level analogue, we add one 
point to the index if the firm is covered under the firm-level provision, t he state law, or both.
11  
For example, a firm that has an Antigreenmail provision and is also covered by the 
                                                 
 
9 In the case of Secret Ballots, shareholder fiduciaries argue that it enables voting without threat of retribution, such 
as the loss of investment-banking business by brokerage-house fiduciaries.  See Gillan and Bethel [2001] and 
McGurn [1989].  
10 Only two other provisions – Antigreenmail and Golden Parachutes – seem at all ambiguous. Since both are 
positively correlated with the vast majority of other firm-level provisions and can logically be viewed as takeover 
defenses, we code them like other defenses and add one point to the index for each.  See their respective entries in 
Appendix A for a discussion. 
11 Firms usually have the option to opt out of state law coverage.  Also, a few state laws require firms to opt in to be 
covered.  The firms that exercise these options are listed in the IRRC data.  When we constructed the State subindex, 
we ignored these options and used the default state coverage.  When we constructed the G index, we included the 
options and used actual coverage.     10
Antigreenmail state law would get one point added to both its  State subindex and its  Other 
subindex, but only one point (not two) would be added to  its overall  G index.  Thus, G has a 
possible range from 1 to 24 and is not just the sum of the five subindices. 
Table II gives summary statistics for G and the subindices in 1990, 1993, 1995, and 1998. 
Table II also shows the frequency of  G by year, broken up into groups beginning with  G £ 5, 
then each value of G from G = 6 through G = 13, and finishing with G ‡ 14.  These ten “deciles” 
are similar but not identical in size, with relative sizes that are fairly stable from 1990 to 1995.  
In the remainder of  the paper, we pay special attention to the two extreme portfolios: the 
“Dictatorship Portfolio” of the firms with the weakest shareholder rights ( G  ‡ 14), and the 
“Democracy Portfolio” of the firms with the strongest shareholder rights ( G  £ 5).  These 
portfolios are updated at the same frequency as G.   
Most of the changes in the distribution of  G come from changes in the sample due to 
mergers, bankruptcies, and additions of new firms by the IRRC. In 1998, the sample size 
increased by about 25 percent, and these new firms tilted toward lower values of G.  At the firm 
level,  G is relatively stable. For individual firms, the mean (absolute) change in  G between 
publication dates (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998) is 0.60, and the median (absolute) change between 
publication dates is zero.
12 
Table III shows the correlations between pairs of subindices. The  Delay,  Protection, 
Voting, and  Other subindices all have positive and significant pairwise correlations with each 
other.  State, however, has negative correlations with Delay, Protection, and Voting.  It could be 
that firms view some of the state laws as substitutes for the firm-level provisions, but then it 
                                                 
12 The IRRC gives dates for some of the provision changes – where available, this data suggests that the majority of 
the provisions were adopted in the 1980s.  Danielson and Karpoff [1998] perform a detailed study on a similar set of 
provisions and demonstrate a rapid pace of change between 1984 and 1989.   11
would be surprising that  Other, which contains three provisions that are direct substitutes for 
state laws, is the o nly subindex that is positively correlated with  State.   Overall, it appears that 
coverage under state laws is not highly correlated with the adoption of firm-level provisions. 
This fact has implications for the analysis of causality, as is discussed in Section IV.         
Table IV lists the ten largest firms (by market capitalization) in the Democracy and 
Dictatorship Portfolios in 1990 and gives the value of G for these firms in 1990 and 1998.  Of the 
ten largest firms in the Democracy Portfolio in 1990,  six of them are still in the Democracy 
Portfolio in 1998, three have dropped out of the portfolio and have G = 6, and one (Berkshire 
Hathaway) disappeared from the sample.
13  The Dictatorship Portfolio has a bit more activity, 
with only two of the top ten f irms remaining in the portfolio, four firms dropping out with  G = 
13, and three firms leaving the sample though mergers or the addition of another class of stock.
14   
Thus, 40 percent (eight out of 20) of the largest firms in the extreme portfolios in 1990 were also 
in these portfolios in 1998.  This is roughly comparable to the full set of firms: among all firms 
in the Democracy and Dictatorship Portfolios in 1990, 31 percent were still in the same 
portfolios in 1998.   
There is no obvious industry concentration among these top firms; the whole portfolios 
are similarly dispersed.  Classifying firms into 48 industries as in Fama and French [1997], the 
portfolios appear to be broadly similar to each other in all years, with a mix of old-economy and 
new-economy industries.
15  Each portfolio has an important technology component. 
“Computers” is the largest industry by market value in the Democracy Portfolio in 1990, with 
                                                 
13 Berkshire Hathaway disappeared because it added a second class of stock before 1998.  Firms with multiple 
classes of common stock are not included in our analysis. 
14NCR disappeared after a merger.  It reappeared in the sample in 1998 as a spin-out, but since it received a new 
permanent number from CRSP, we treat the new NCR as a different company. 
15 The industry names are from Fama and French [1997], but use a slightly updated version of the SIC classification 
of these industries that is given on Ken French’s website (June 2001).  In Sections III and V, we use both this 
updated classification and the corresponding industry returns (also from the French website).        12
22.4 percent of the portfolio, falling to third place with 12.3 percent of the value in 1998. 
“Communications” does not make the top five in market value for the Dictatorship Portfolio in 
1990, but rises to first place with 25.3 percent of the portfolio in 1998.   
 
III.  Governance: Empirical Relationships 
A. Summary Statistics 
Table V gives summary statistics and correlations for  G (and subindices) with a set of 
firm characteristics as of September 1990: book-to-market ratio, firm size, share price, monthly 
trading volume, Tobin’s  Q, dividend yield, S&P 500 inclusion, past five-year stock return, past 
five-year sales growth, and percentage of institutional ownership. The first four of these 
characteristics are in logs.  The construction of each characteristic is described in Appendix B. 
The first column of Table V gives the correlation of each of these characteristics with G, the next 
two columns give the mean value in the Democracy and Dictatorship Portfolios, and the final 
column gives the difference between these means. These results are descriptive and are intended 
to provide some background for the analyses in the following sections.   
The strongest relation is between  G and S&P 500 inclusion.  The correlation between 
these variables is positive and significant  -- about half of the Dictatorship Portfolio is drawn 
from S&P 500 firms compared to 15 percent of the Democracy Portfolio.  Given this finding, it 
is not surprising that  G is also positively correlated with size, share price, trading volume, and 
institutional ownership. S&P firms tend to have relatively high levels of all of these 
characteristics.  In addition, the correlation of  G with five-year sales growth is negative and 
significant, suggesting that high-G firms had relatively lower sales growth over the second half 
of the 1980s, the period when many of the provisions were first adopted.     13
Correlations at other times in the sample period (not shown in the table) are similar.  
Overall, it appears that firms with weaker shareholder rights tend to be large S&P firms with 
relatively high share prices, institutional ownership and trading volume, relatively poor sales 
growth, and poor stock-market performance.   The 1990s were a time of rising activism by 
institutional investors and more attention to governance provisions; thus, we might expect to see 
some reduction in the institutional ownership of h igh-G firms.  In untabulated tests, we find no 
evidence of such a reduction, with both pairwise correlations and multivariate analysis 
suggesting no robust relationship between G and changes in institutional ownership.    
 
B. Governance and Returns 
If corporate governance matters for firm performance  and this relationship is fully 
incorporated by the market, then a stock price should quickly adjust to any relevant change in the 
firm’s governance.  This is the logic behind the use of event studies to analyze the impact of 
takeover defenses.  If such a reaction occurs, then expected returns on the stock would be 
unaffected beyond the event window.  If, however, governance matters but is not incorporated 
immediately into stock prices, then realized returns on t he stock would differ systematically from 
equivalent securities.   
In this section, we examine the relationship between  G  and subsequent returns.  An 
investment of $1 in the (value-weighted) Dictatorship Portfolio on September 1, 1990, when our 
data begin, would have grown to $3.39 by December 31, 1999.  In contrast, a $1 investment in 
the Democracy Portfolio would have grown to $7.07 over the same period.  This is equivalent to 
annualized returns of 14.0 percent for the Dictatorship Portfolio and 23.3 percent for the 
Democracy Portfolio, a difference of more than nine percent per year.      14
What can explain this disparity? One possible explanation is that the performance 
differences are driven by differences in the riskiness or “style” of the two portfolios.  
Researchers have identified several equity characteristics that explain differences in realized 
returns. In addition to differences in exposure to the market factor (“beta”), a firm’s market 
capitalization (or “size”), book-to-market ratio (or other “value” characteristics), and immediate 
past returns (“momentum”) have all been shown to significantly forecast future returns.
16  If the 
Dictatorship Portfolio differs significantly from the Democracy Portfolio in these characteristics, 
then style differences may explain at least part of the difference in annualized raw returns. 
Several methods have been developed to account for these style differences in a system of 
performance attribution.  We employ one method here and use another in Section V.  The four-
factor model of Carhart [1997] is estimated by: 
 
(1)     Rt = a   + b1 * RMRFt + b2 * SMBt + b3 * HMLt + b4 * Momentumt + et     
                 
where  Rt is the excess return to some asset in month  t,  RMRFt is the month  t value-weighted 
market return minus the risk-free rate, and the terms SMBt   (small minus big), HMLt (high minus 
low), and  Momentumt   are the month  t returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios 
designed to capture size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, respectively.
17 Although there 
is ongoing debate about whether these factors are proxies for risk, we take no position on this 
issue and simply view the four-factor model as a method of performance attribution. Thus, we 
                                                 
16 See Basu [1977] (price-to-earnings ratio), Banz [1981] (size), Fama and French [1993] (size and book-to-market), 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny [1994] (several value measures), and Jegadeesh and Titman [1993] (momentum).  
17  This model extends the Fama-French [1993] three-factor model with the addition of a momentum factor.  For 
details on the construction of the factors, see Fama and French [1993] and Carhart [1997]. We are grateful to Ken 
French for providing the factor returns for SMB and HML.  Momentum returns were calculated by the authors using 
the procedures of Carhart [1997].   15
interpret the estimated intercept coefficient, “alpha”, as the abnormal return in excess of what 
could have been achieved by passive investments in the factors.  
The first row of Table VI shows the results of estimating (1) where the dependent 
variable,  Rt,  is the monthly return difference between the Democracy and Dictatorship Portfolios.  
Thus, the alpha in this estimation is the abnormal return on a zero-investment strategy that buys 
the Democracy Portfolio and sells short the Dictatorship Portfolio. For this specification, the 
alpha is 71 basis points (bp) per month, o r about 8.5 percent per year.  This point estimate is 
statistically significant at the one-percent level.  Thus, very little of the difference in raw returns 
can be attributed to style differences in the two portfolios.     
The remaining rows of Table VI s ummarize the results of estimating (1) for all ten 
“deciles” of  G, including the extreme deciles comprising the Democracy ( G  £ 5) and 
Dictatorship ( G  ‡ 14)  Portfolios. As the table shows, the significant performance difference 
between the Democracy and D ictatorship Portfolios is driven both by overperformance (for the 
Democracy Portfolio) and underperformance (by the Dictatorship Portfolio). The Democracy 
Portfolio earns a positive and significant alpha of 29 bp per month, while the Dictatorship 
Portfolio earns a negative and significant alpha of –42 bp per month. 
 The results also show that alpha decreases as  G increases.  The Democracy Portfolio 
earns the highest alpha of all the deciles, and the next two highest alphas, 24 and 22 bp, are 
earned by the third (G = 7) and second (G = 6) deciles, respectively.   The Dictatorship Portfolio 
earns the lowest alpha, and the second lowest alpha is earned by the eighth ( G = 12) decile.  
Furthermore, the four lowest  G deciles earn positive alphas, while the three h ighest  G deciles 
earn negative alphas.  More formally, a Spearman rank-correlation test of the null hypothesis of   16
no correlation between  G-decile rankings and alpha rankings yields a test statistic of 0.842, and 
is rejected at the one-percent level. 
Table  VII reports several variations of the abnormal-return results.  In each variation, we 
estimate the performance-attribution regression in equation (1) on the return difference between 
the Democracy and Dictatorship Portfolios, while changing some aspect of  the portfolio 
construction or return calculation. We perform all of these tests using both value-weighted (VW) 
and equal-weighted (EW) portfolios.  These tests allow us to estimate the fraction of the 
benchmark abnormal returns that can be attributed to industry composition, choice of cutoffs for 
the extreme portfolios, new provisions during the decade, legal variation across states, and 
different time periods.  
The first row of Table VII replicates the baseline portfolio construction used above.  The 
remaining rows of the table summarize tests using industry-adjusted returns (Row 2), two 
alternative constructions of the extreme portfolios (Rows 3 and 4), fixed portfolios built with 
1990 levels of  G  (Row 5),  a subsample that includes only Delaware firms  (Row 6), and 
subsamples split between the first half and the second half of the sample period (Rows 7 and 8). 
Details of each of these constructions are given in the table note.  The main themes of these 
results are, first, that the VW returns (Democracy minus Dictatorship) are economically large in 
all cases and, second, the EW abnormal returns are usually about two-thirds of the VW abnormal 
returns.  Most of the return differential can be attributed to within-state variation already in place 
in 1990, and this return differential is apparent in both halves of the sample period. 
Overall, we find significant evidence that the Democracy Portfolio outperformed the 
Dictatorship Portfolio in the 1990s.  We also find some evidence of a monotonic relationship 
between  G and returns.  It would be useful to know which subindices and provisions drive these   17
results. We address this issue in depth within the broader analysis of causality and omitted-
variable bias in Section V, so we defer a detailed analysis until then.   
 
C. Governance and the Value of the Firm       
 It is well established that state and national laws of corporate governance affect firm 
value.  La Porta et al. [2001] show that firm value is positively associated with the rights of 
minority shareholders. Daines [2001] finds that firms incorporated in Delaware have higher 
valuations than other U.S. firms.  In this section, we study whether variation in firm-specific 
governance is associated with differences in firm value.  More importantly, we analyze whether 
there was a change in the governance/value relationship during the 1990s.  Since there is 
evidence of differential stock returns as a function of  G, we would expect to find relative 
“mispricing” between 1990 and 1999 as a function of G.  
Our valuation measure is Tobin’s  Q, which has been used for this purpose in corporate-
governance studies since the work of Demsetz and Lehn [1985] and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
[1988].  We follow Kaplan and Zingales’ [1997] method for the computation of  Q (details are 
listed in Appendix B) and also compute the median  Q in each year in each of the 48 industries 
classified by Fama and French [1997].   We then regress 
 
(2)         Q’it  = at + btXit + ctWit + eit,         
 
where  Q’it  is industry-adjusted  Q  (firm  Q minus industry-median  Q),  Xit is a vector of 
governance variables (G, its components, or inclusion in one of the extreme portfolios) and Wit is 
a vector of firm characteristics.  As elements of  W, we follow Shin and Stulz [2000] and include   18
the log of the book value of assets and the log of firm age as of December of year t.
18  Daines 
[2001] found that  Q is different for Delaware and non-Delaware firms, so we also include a 
Delaware dummy in  W.  Morck and Yang [2001] show that S&P 500 inclusion has a positive 
impact on  Q, a nd that this impact increased during the 1990s; thus, we also include a dummy 
variable for S&P 500 inclusion in W. 
Using a variant of the methods of Fama and MacBeth [1973], we estimate annual cross-
sections of (2) with statistical significance assessed within each year (by cross-sectional standard 
errors) and across all years (with the time-series standard error of the mean coefficient). This 
method of assessing statistical significance deserves some explanation.  In particular, one logical 
alternative would be a pooled setup with firm fixed effects and time-varying coefficients.  We 
rejected this alternative mainly because there are few changes over time in the Governance 
Index, and the inclusion of fixed effects would force identification of the G coefficient from only 
these changes. In effect, our chosen method imposes a structure on the fixed effects: they must 
be a linear function of G or its components. 
Table VIII summarizes the results.  The first column gives the results with G as the key 
regressor.  Each row gives the coefficients and standard errors for a different year of the sample; 
the last row gives the average coefficient and time-series standard error of these coefficients.  
The coefficients on  G  are negative in every year and significantly negative in nine of the ten 
years.    The largest absolute value point estimate occurs in 1999, and the second largest is in 
1998.   The point estimate in 1999 is economically large; a one-point increase in G, equivalent to 
adding a single governance provision, is associated with an 11.4 percentage point lower value for 
                                                 
18 Unlike Shin and Stulz [2000], we do not trim the sample of observations that have extreme independent variables. 
Results with a trimmed sample are nearly identical and are available from the authors.    19
Q.   If we assume that the point estimates in 1990 and 1999 are independent, then the difference 
between these two estimates (11.4 – 2.2 = 9.2) is statistically significant.  
In the second column of Table VIII, we restrict the sample to include only firms in the 
Democracy and Dictatorship Portfolios.  We then estimate (2) using a dummy variable for the 
Democracy Portfolio.  The results are consistent with the previous regressions on  G.  The point 
estimate for 1999 is the largest in the decade, implying that firms in the Democracy Portfolio 
have a  Q that is 56 percentage points higher, other things being equal, than do firms in the 
Dictatorship Portfolio.  This compares to an estimated difference  of 19 percentage points in 
1990.  While the difference in coefficients between 1990 and 1999 is not statistically significant, 
it is similar to the total EW difference in abnormal returns estimated in Table VII.
19  There is no 
real pattern for the rest of the decade, however, and large standard errors toward the end of the 
sample period prevent any strong inference across years.   
The final columns of Table VIII give results using the five governance subindices:  Delay, 
Voting, Protection, Other,  and  State.  The table shows that all subindices except Voting have 
average coefficients that are negative and significant (assuming independence across years). 
Over the full sample period,  Delay  and  Protection have the most consistent impact, while the 
largest absolute coefficients are for  Voting at the end of the sample period.  The subindices are 
highly collinear, however, and the resulting large standard errors and covariances make it 
difficult to draw strong conclusions. For example, even in 1999 we cannot reject t he null 
hypothesis that the coefficient on Voting is equal to the coefficient on Delay.  
                                                 
19 Table VII, first row, second column, shows an alpha of 45 bp per month for the EW difference between the 
Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios.    Over 112 months this produces a difference of approximately 50 percent, 
as compared to the 56 – 19 = 37 percent difference estimated for the Q regressions.  We use the EW alpha as a 
comparison because the Q regressions are also equal-weighted.     20
Overall, the results for returns and prices tell a consistent story.  Firms with the weakest 
shareholder rights (high values of  G) significantly underperformed firms w ith the strongest 
shareholder rights (low values of  G) during the 1990s. Over the course of the 1990s, these 
differences have been at least partially reflected in prices.  While high-G firms already sold at a 
significant discount in 1990, this discount became much larger by 1999. 
 
D. Governance and Operating Performance 
Table IX shows the results of annual regressions for three operational measures on  G (or 
a Democracy dummy). The three operational measures are the net profit margin (income divided 
by sales), the return on equity (income divided by book equity), and one-year sales growth. All 
of these measures are industry-adjusted by subtracting the median for this measure in the 
corresponding Fama-French [1997] industry. This adjustment uses all available  Compustat firms. 
To reduce the influence of large outliers – a common occurrence for all of these measures -- we 
estimate median (least-absolute-deviation) regressions in each case. While our sample does not 
include a natural experiment to identify  G as the cause of operational differences, we attempt to 
control for “expected” cross-sectional differences by using the log book-to-market ratio (BM) as 
an additional explanatory variable.   
The odd-numbered columns give the results when  G  is the key regressor.  We find that 
the average coefficient on  G is negative and significant for both the net-profit-margin and sales-
growth regressions, and is negative but not significant for the return-on-equity regressions. The 
even-numbered columns give the results for the subsample of firms from the extreme deciles, 
with a dummy variable for the Democracy Portfolio as the key regressor.  For all three operating 
measures, the average coefficient on this dummy variable was positive but insignificant. Thus,   21
these results are  consistent with the evidence for the full sample but not significant on their own. 
In untabulated results, we also regressed these same measures on the five subindices.  The results 
show no clear pattern of differential influence for any particular subindex, with most coefficients 
having the same sign as  G.  Overall, we find some significant evidence that more democratic 
firms have better operating performance and no evidence that they do not. 
 
IV.  Governance: Three Hypotheses 
 
Section III established an empirical relationship of  G  with returns, firm value, and operating 
performance.  Since firms did not adopt governance provisions randomly, this evidence does not 
itself imply a causal role by governance provisions. Indeed, there are several plausible 
explanations for our results: 
 
Hypothesis I) Governance provisions cause higher agency costs.  These higher costs were 
underestimated by investors in 1990. 
 
Hypothesis II) Governance provisions do not cause higher agency costs, but rather were put in 
place by 1980s managers who forecasted poor performance for their firms in the 1990s.   
 
Hypothesis III) Governance provisions do not cause higher agency costs, but their presence is 
correlated with other characteristics that earned abnormal returns in the 1990s. 
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Most e xplanations of the Section III results can be fit within these three hypotheses.  
Under Hypothesis I, a reduction in shareholder rights causes an unexpectedly large increase in 
agency costs through some combination of inefficient investment, reduced operational 
efficiency, or self-dealing.  If shareholders find it difficult or costly to replace managers, then 
managers may be more willing and able to extract private benefits.  This is the standard 
justification for takeover threats as the strongest form of m anagerial discipline [Jensen 1986].  
For Hypothesis I to be correct, these additional agency costs must have been underestimated in 
1990.   
Under Hypothesis II, governance does not affect performance, but there must be a 
perception that governance provisions are protective for management.   In this case, the stock in 
these companies would have been relatively overvalued in 1990, even though objective measures 
(e.g.,  Q regressions) would suggest that it was undervalued relative to observable characteristics.  
When the poor operating performance occurs, the market is surprised but the managers are not.  
The protective provisions then supply a shield, real or imagined, for managerial jobs and 
compensation.   
Under Hypothesis III, all of the results in the previous section would be driven by 
omitted-variable bias.   Since governance provisions were certainly not adopted randomly, it is 
plausible that differences in industry, S&P 500 inclusion, institutional ownership, or other firm 
characteristics could be correlated both with  G and with abnormal returns.   Under this 
hypothesis, governance provisions could be completely innocuous, with no influence either on 
managerial power or on agency costs.  
Ideally, we would distinguish among these three hypotheses by using  random variation in 
some characteristic that was causal for G.  Unfortunately, we have not been able to identify such   23
an instrument.  One candidate would be the subset of state laws, with the  State subindex as a 
proxy.  Though in some states these laws were passed at the urging of large corporations, it 
seems reasonable to assume that their passage was exogenous to most firms.  But the  State 
subindex has three flaws as an instrument.  First, firms can choose to reincorporate into different 
states; enough firms have done so that exposure to state laws is not truly exogenous 
[Subramanian 2001].  Second, many firms have opted out of the protections of some of the most 
stringent of these laws, so that a firm’s state of incorporation is only a noisy measure for i ts 
actual legal exposure.  Third, as shown in Table III, the  State subindex is not positively or 
consistently correlated with the other components of  G.  Other potential instruments have 
different problems.  For example, if takeover protections were adopted during industry-specific 
takeover waves, then we might be able to use industry as an instrument for  G.  Unfortunately, 
this would render it impossible to distinguish between  G or industry as the cause of poor returns 
in the 1990s.  
  In Section V, our tests consist of a search for evidence supportive of each hypothesis, 
while acknowledging the impossibility of a perfect test to distinguish among them. First, if 
Hypothesis I is correct, then we should observe some "unexpected" differences in agency costs 
across firms. We discuss several previous studies on this topic and look for such differences in 
our sample by analyzing capital expenditure and acquisition behavior. Second, for Hypothesis II, 
we analyze insider-trading activity as a function of  G.  If governance provisions were put in 
place by prescient managers, these same managers might be net sellers of the stock in their firms. 
Finally, for Hypothesis III, we test whether a large set of observable firm characteristics can 
explain the empirical relationship between returns and G.  
   24
V.  Governance:  Tests 
In this section we examine the evidence for each of the hypotheses described in Section 
IV.  Section V.A covers Hypothesis I, Section V.B covers Hypothesis II, and Section V.C covers 
Hypothesis III.   Section V.D summarizes and discusses the evidence.   
 
A. Evidence on Hypothesis I 
Increased agency costs at high-G firms can directly affect firm performance in several 
ways.  In the specific case of state takeover laws, where causality is easier to establish, 
researchers  have found evidence of increased agency costs through a variety of mechanisms. 
Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino [1997] show that compensation rises for CEOs of firms 
adopting takeover defenses.  Bertrand and Mullainathan [1999a, 1999b, and 2000] find a similar 
result for CEOs and other employees in firms newly covered by state takeover laws.  They also 
find that these laws cause a decrease in plant-level efficiency, measured either by total factor 
productivity or return on capital. Garvey and Hanka [1999] show that state takeover laws led to 
changes in leverage consistent with increased corporate slack.  These studies provide the cleanest 
evidence in support of Hypothesis I, but, of course, do not make use of the full variation 
embodied in the  G  index.  We supplement these findings by examining the empirical relationship 
of  G with two other possible sources of agency costs: capital expenditure and acquisition 
behavior. 
A substantial literature, dating back at least to Baumol [1959], Marris [1964], and 
Williamson [1964], holds that managers may undertake inefficient projects in order to extract 
private benefits.  This problem is particularly severe when managers are entrenched and can 
resist hostile takeovers [Jensen and Ruback 1983, Shleifer and Vishny 1989].  Under this view, if   25
capital expenditure increases following the adoption of new takeover defenses, this increase 
would be a net negative for firm value.
20  
To examine the empirical relationship between capital expenditure and governance, we 
estimate annual median regressions for capital expenditure (CAPEX), scaled by either sales or 
assets, and net of the industry median.  To control for the different investment opportunities 
available at value and growth firms, we include the log book-to-market ratio (BM) as a control 
variable in all specifications.    Table X summarizes the results, with BM coefficients omitted.   
Columns (1) and (3) give results for the full sample, with  G as the key regressor; columns (2) 
and (4) give results for the sample r estricted to firms in the Democracy and Dictatorship 
Portfolios, with a Democracy dummy as the key regressor.  The average coefficient on  G is 
positive and significant in both sets of regressions.   Consistent with these results, we find that 
the average c oefficient on the Democracy dummy is negative and significant in both sets of 
regressions.  We conclude that, other things equal, high-G firms have higher CAPEX than do 
low-G firms.   
Another outlet for capital expenditure is for firms to acquire other firms.  Some of the 
strongest evidence for the importance of agency costs comes from the negative returns to 
acquirer stocks after a bid is announced.  Considerable evidence shows that these negative 
returns are correlated with other agency problems, including low managerial ownership 
[Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld 1985], high free-cash flow [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 1991], 
and diversifying transactions [Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990].   In addition to negative 
announcement returns, there is also long-run evidence of negative abnormal performance by 
                                                 
20 For an alternative view, see Stein [1988 and 1989].  Empirical evidence on this issue is given by Daines and 
Klausner [2001], Johnson and Rao [1997], Meulbroek et al. [1990], Pugh, Page, and Jahera [1992], and Titman, 
Wei, and Xie [2001].       26
acquirer firms [Loughran and Vijh 1997, Rao and Vermaelen 1998].
21  Taken together, these 
studies suggest acquisitions as another pathway through which governance affects performance.  
To analyze the relation  between acquisition activity and  G, we use the SDC database to 
identify all transactions in which a sample firm acted as either the acquirer or the seller during 
the sample period.  From January 1991 through December 1999, there are 12,694 acquisitions 
made by sample firms; SDC gives the acquisition price for just under half of these. For each 
firm, we count the number of acquisitions (“Acquisition Count”). We also calculate the sum of 
the price of all acquisitions in each calendar year and divide this sum  by the firm’s average 
market capitalization for the first day and last day of the year (“Acquisition Ratio”).   
Table XI summarizes the results of annual regressions for both Acquisition Count and the 
Acquisition Ratio in year t on  G (or a Democracy dummy), the log of size, the log of the book-
to-market ratio, and 48 industry dummies, all measured at year-end  t-1.  Coefficients on all 
control variables are omitted from the table.  Since many firms make no acquisitions in a year, 
the dependent variables are  effectively left-censored at zero.  To account for this censoring, we 
estimate Poisson regressions for Acquisition Count and Tobit regressions for the Acquisition 
Ratio.   Columns (1) and (3) give results for the full sample, with  G as the key regressor; 
columns (2) and (4) give results for the sample restricted to firms in the Democracy and 
Dictatorship portfolios, with a Democracy dummy as the key regressor. For both sets of 
regressions, the coefficients on  G are positive in every year, and the average coefficient on  G is 
positive and significant.  Consistent with this result, the average coefficient on the Democracy 
dummy is negative for both sets of regressions and is significant for Acquisition Count.  
                                                 
21 Mitchell and Stafford [2000] have challenged the magnitude of this long-run evidence, but still allow for some 
underperformance for acquisitions financed by stock.  A related debate on whether diversifying acquisitions destroy 
value has grown too large to survey here.  The seminal works are Lang and Stulz [1994] and Berger and Ofek 
[1995].  Recent work is summarized in Holmstrom and Kaplan [2001] and Stein [2001].   27
One interpretation of these results is that high-G  firms engaged in an unexpectedly large 
amount of inefficient investment during the 1990s. This interpretation is consistent with 
contemporaneous unexpected differences in profitability, stock returns, and firm value.  This 
inefficient investment does not n ecessarily mean that firms are attempting to maximize their size 
in a form of empire building.  Indeed, empire building would be inconsistent with the negative 
relationship between sales growth and  G found in Table IX.  Instead, managers may be 
attempting  to stave off “empire collapse” with high expenditure and acquisition activity.  In that 
case, the results of this section are consistent with the evidence of Table IX. 
  
B. Evidence on Hypothesis II 
It is well established that insider trading can forecast  returns.  Firms whose shares have 
been intensively sold (bought) by insiders tend to underperform (overperform) benchmarks in 
subsequent periods.
22 If some 1980s insiders forecasted poor performance for their firms, we 
might expect them to have looked for w ays to keep the shareholders from firing them, either 
through voting or takeovers. In this case, weak shareholder rights would be a symptom of 
insiders’ superior information, but would not necessarily be the cause of the poor performance in 
the subsequent decade.   
To study this possibility, we use data collected by Thomson Financial from the required 
SEC insider-trading filings.  For each firm in our sample, we sum all (split-adjusted) open-
market transactions for all insiders in each year, with purchases  entering positively and sales 
entering negatively.  We then normalize this sum by shares outstanding at the beginning of the 
year to arrive at a "Net Purchases" measure for each firm in each year.  If insiders put new 
                                                 
22 See Seyhun [1998] for a comprehensive review of this literature and a discussion of SEC rules, filing 
requirements, and available data.   28
provisions in place when they forecast poor performance, then we would expect Net Purchases to 
be negatively correlated with G. 
We employ two regression specifications.  First, we estimate OLS regressions of Net 
Purchases on  G (or a Democracy dummy), BM, and log of size.  For some firm-years, the Net 
Purchase measure is dominated by one large transaction.  While large transactions might have 
information content, they might also reflect liquidity or rebalancing needs. In an OLS regression, 
firms with large outliers will dominate.  Thus, we also  estimate ordered logit regressions on the 
same OLS regressors, in which the dependent variable is equal to one if Net Purchases is 
positive, zero if Net Purchases is zero, and negative one if Net Purchases is negative. 
 Table XII summarizes the results of  these regressions.   Columns (1) and (3) give results 
for the full sample, with  G as the key regressor; columns (2) and (4) give results for the sample 
restricted to firms in the Democracy and Dictatorship Portfolios with a Democracy dummy as the 
key regressor.  Coefficients on all control variables are omitted from the table.  We find no 
significant relationships between governance and insider trading.  Two of four sets of regressions 
have positive average coefficients, two have negative average coefficients, and none of these 
average coefficients are significant.  In untabulated results, we also estimated median 
regressions, replicated all of the above results using all transactions (the main difference is the 
inclusion of option-exercise transactions), and estimated long-horizon regressions using all years 
of data for each firm.  In none of these cases did we find a robust relationship between 
governance and insider trading.   Overall, we find no support for Hypothesis II in the insider-
trading data. 
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C. Evidence on Hypothesis III 
What other factors might be driving the return difference between the Democracy and 
Dictatorship portfolios?  We saw in Table II that G is correlated with several firm characteristics, 
including S&P 500 membership, institutional  ownership, trading volume, and past sales growth.   
If returns to stocks with these characteristics differed in the 1990s in a way not captured by the 
model in equation (1), then a type of omitted variable bias may drive the abnormal-return results.  
In this section, we explore this possibility using a cross-sectional regression approach. In 
addition to providing evidence on Hypothesis III, this method also supplements the analysis of 
Section III.B by allowing a separate regressor for each component of G. 
For each month in the sample period, September 1990 to December 1999, we estimate 
 
(3)         rit =  at + bt Xit + ct Zit + eit ,          
 
where, for firm  i in month t, rit are the returns (either raw or industry-adjusted),  Xit is a vector of 
governance variables (either  G, its components, or inclusion in one of the extreme portfolios), 
and Zit is a vector of firm characteristics.  As elements of  Z, we include the full set of regressors 
used by Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam [1998], plus five-year sales growth, S&P 500 
inclusion, and institutional ownership.
23 Variable definitions are given in Appendix B.  
We estimate (3) separately for each month and then calculate the mean and time-series 
standard deviation of the 112 monthly estimates of the coefficients.   Table XIII summarizes the 
results. The first two columns give the results, raw and industry-adjusted, for the full sample of 
firms in each month with  G  as the key independent variable.  In both regressions, the average 
                                                 
23 All of these additional variables are correlated with G (see Table III) and, in prior studies, with either firm value 
or abnormal returns.  See Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny [1994] (sales growth), Gompers and Metrick [2001] 
(institutional ownership), and Morck and Yang [2001] (Q).   30
coefficient on  G is negative but not significant.  The point estimates are not small. For example, 
the point estimate for the coefficient on  G in column 3 implies a lower return of approximately 
four bp per month (= 48 bp per year) for each additional point of  G, but it would require 
estimates nearly twice as large before statistical significance would be reached.   
The next two columns give the results when the sample is restricted to stocks in either the 
Democracy ( G  £ 5) or Dictatorship ( G  ‡ 14) portfolios.  In the first column, the dependent 
variable is the raw monthly return for each stock.  In the second column, the dependent variable 
is the industry-adjusted return for each stock, where industry adjustments are relative to the 
Fama and French [1997] 48 industries.  The key independent variable in these regressions is the 
Democracy dummy, set equal to one if the stock is in the Democracy Portfolio and zero if the 
stock is in the Dictatorship Portfolio.  For both the raw and industry-adjusted returns, the 
coefficient on this dummy variable is positive and significant at the one-percent level.  The 
average point estimate can be interpreted as a monthly abnormal return.  These point estimates, 
76 bp per month raw and 63 bp per month industry-adjusted, are similar to those found in the 
factor models, and provide a further robustness check to the benchmark result.    Here, industry 
adjustments explain about one-sixth of the raw result.   In the factor-model results of Table VII, 
the industry adjustment explained about one-third of the raw result. 
Columns (5) and (6) of Table XIII give the results for the full sample of firms when the 
five subindices are used as the components of  X.  In principle, these regressions could help us 
distinguish between Hypotheses I and III.  If governance provisions  cause poor performance, 
then we might expect certain provisions to play a stronger role. In the absence of such a finding, 
we should wonder if the results are driven by some other characteristic. For example, some legal 
scholars argue that the Delay provisions are the only defenses with deterrent value [Coates 2000,   31
Daines and Klausner 2001].  If managers also believe this, then the Delay subindex should also 
be the most important driver of the results.   
Unfortunately, large standard errors, due in part to the substantial multicollinearity 
between the regressors, makes it difficult to construct a powerful test.  None of the subindex 
coefficients are statistically significant in either specification, but many of the point estimates are 
economically large. In the end, we cannot precisely measure the relative importance of  Delay or 
any other subindex. This is similar to the problem that occurred in the  Q  regressions of Table 
VIII.  For example, in both Tables VIII and XIII, the coefficients on  Voting suggest potentially 
enormous economic significance, but large standard errors prevent any meaningful statistical 
inference.  
In untabulated tests, we also included all 28 provisions from Table I as separate 
regressors in (3).  Regressing raw returns on these 28 provisions plus the same controls as in 
Table XIII, we find that 16 of the coefficients are negative, and only one (Unequal Voting) is 
significant. (With this many regressors, we would expect one to appear “significant” just by 
chance.) Results for industry-adjusted returns are similar.  These results highlight and magnify 
the lack of power in the subindex regressions.  Indeed, many of the point estimates imply return 
effects above 20 basis points per month (2.4 percent per year), but are still far from being 
statistically significant.  This result also suggests that the Democracy-minus-Dictatorship return 
differences are not driven by the presence or absence of any one provision. 
    
D. Discussion 
  The evidence in sections V.A, V.B, and V.C must be interpreted w ith caution.  Since this 
is an experiment without random assignment, no analysis of causality can be conclusive.  The   32
main problem is the possibility that some unobserved characteristic is correlated with  G and is 
also the main cause of abnormal returns. T his type of omitted-variable bias could be something 
prosaic, such as imperfect industry adjustments or model misspecification, or something more 
difficult to quantify, such as a partially unobservable or immeasurable “corporate culture”.  
Under the latter explanation, management behavior would be constrained by cultural norms 
within the firm, and democracy and dictatorship would be a persistent feature of a corporate 
culture; G would be a symptom, but not a cause, of this culture.  In this case, all the results of the 
paper could be explained if investors mispriced culture in 1990, just as they appear to have 
mispriced its proxy, G.   The policy impact of reducing  G would be nonexistent unless it affected 
the culture of managerial power that was the true driver of poor performance. 
  In addition to the three hypotheses considered above, other explanations fall into the 
general class of “Type I” error.  For example, one could argue that investors in 1990 had rational 
expectations about the expected costs and b enefits of takeover defenses, where the expected 
costs are more severe agency problems and the expected benefits are higher takeover premia. 
Then, when the hostile takeover market largely evaporated in the early 1990s – perhaps because 
of macroeconomic conditions unrelated to takeover defenses  – Dictatorship firms were left with 
the costs but none of the benefits of their defenses.  Over the subsequent decade, the expected 
takeover premia eroded as investors gradually learned about the weak takeover market.  Simple 
calculations suggest that this explanation cannot be that important.  Suppose that in 1990 the 
expected takeover probability for Dictatorship firms was 30 percent, and the expected takeover 
premium conditional on takeover was also 30 percent. Further suppose that both of these 
numbers were zero for Democracy firms.  Then, the unconditional expected takeover premium   33
for Dictatorship firms would have been only nine percent, which is approximately the relative 
underperformance of these firms for only a single year. 
In sum, we find some evidence in support of Hypothesis I and no evidence in support of 
Hypothesis II.  For Hypothesis III, we find that industry classification can explain somewhere 
between one-sixth and one-third of the benchmark abnormal r eturns, but we do not find any 
other observable characteristic that explains the remaining abnormal return.  The subindex 
regressions, which might be helpful in distinguishing between Hypotheses I and III, are not 
powerful enough for strong inference.  We  conclude that the remaining performance differences, 
which are economically large, were either directly caused by governance provisions (Hypothesis 
I), or were related to unobservable or difficult-to-measure characteristics correlated with 
governance provisions (Hypothesis III).  
  What do these hypotheses imply about abnormal returns in the future?  None suggests 
any obvious pattern for the relationship between  G and returns.  Under Hypothesis I, if we 
interpret our test as a long-run event study, then there is no reason to expect any relationship 
once the market has fully priced the underlying “event” of corporate governance.  The fact that 
this price adjustment is taking such a long time does not seem so surprising in light of the 
lengthy intervals necessary for much more tangible information to be incorporated into prices.
24 
Thus, to the extent that end-of-sample price adjustment is incomplete, complete, or has 
overreacted, the future relationship between  G and returns could be negative, zero, or positive. 
Under Hypothesis II, there is a similar dependence on whether past insider information has been 
fully incorporated into prices.  Under Hypothesis III, future return differences would be driven 
the relevant omitted characteristic; clearly, this hypothesis yields no clear prediction.    
                                                 
24 For example, there is evidence that earnings surprises [Bernard and Thomas 1989], dividend omissions [Michaely, 
Thaler, and Womack 1995], and stock repurchases [Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1995] have long-term 
drift following the event, and all seem to be relatively simple events compared to changes in governance structure.    34
VI.  Conclusion 
 
The power-sharing relationship between investors and managers is defined by the rules of 
corporate governance. Beginning in the late 1980s, there is significant and stable variation in 
these rules across different  firms.  Using 24 distinct corporate-governance provisions for a 
sample of about 1,500 firms per year during the 1990s, we build a Governance Index, denoted as 
G, as a proxy for the balance of power between managers and shareholders in each firm.  We 
then analyze the empirical relationship of this index with corporate performance.    
We find that corporate governance is strongly correlated with stock returns during the 
1990s.  An investment strategy that purchased shares in the lowest-G firms (“Democracy” firms  
with strong shareholder rights), and sold shares in the the highest-G firms (“Dictatorship” firms 
with weak shareholder rights), earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year. At the beginning 
of the sample, there is already a significant relationship between valuation and governance: each 
one-point increase in  G is associated with a decrease in Tobin’s Q of 2.2 percentage points.  By 
the end of the decade, this difference has increased significantly, with a one-point increase in  G 
associated with a  decrease in Tobin’s  Q  of 11.4 percentage points. The results for both stock 
returns and firm value are economically large and are robust to many controls and other firm 
characteristics.   
  We consider several explanations for the results, but the data do n ot allow strong 
conclusions about causality.  There is some evidence, both in our sample and from other authors, 
that weak shareholder rights caused poor performance in the 1990s. It is also possible that the 
results are driven by some unobservable firm characteristic.  These multiple causal explanations 
have starkly different policy implications and stand as a challenge for future research.  The   35
empirical evidence of this paper establishes the high stakes of this challenge.  If an 11.4 
percentage point difference in firm value were even partially “caused” by each additional 
governance provision, then the long-run benefits of eliminating multiple provisions would be 
enormous.  
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Appendix A – Corporate-Governance Provisions 
This appendix describes the provisions listed in Table I and used as components of the 
Governance Index.  The shorthand title of each provision, as used in the text of the paper, is 
given in bold.  These descriptions are given in alphabetical order and are similar to Rosenbaum 
[1998].  For  a few provisions, we discuss their impact on shareholder rights or the logic behind 
their categorization in Table I. 
 
Antigreenmail  – Greenmail refers to a transaction between a large shareholder and a 
company in which the shareholder agrees to sell his stock back to the company, usually at a 
premium, in exchange for the promise not to seek control of the company for a specified period 
of time.  Antigreenmail provisions prevent such arrangements unless the same repurchase offer is 
made to all shareholders o r approved by a shareholder vote.  Such provisions are thought to 
discourage accumulation of large blocks of stock because one source of exit for the stake is 
closed, but the net effect on shareholder wealth is unclear [Shleifer and Vishny 1986, Eckbo 
1990].    Five states have specific Antigreenmail laws, and two other states have “recapture of 
profits” laws, which enable firms to recapture raiders’ profits earned in the secondary market. 
We consider recapture of profits laws to be a version of Antigreenmail laws (albeit a stronger 
one).  The presence of firm-level Antigreenmail provisions is positively correlated with 18 out of 
the other 21 firm-level provisions, is significantly positive in eight of these cases, and is not 
significantly negative for any o f them. Furthermore, states with Antigreenmail laws tend to pass 
them in conjunction with laws more clearly designed to prevent takeovers [Pinnell 2000]. Since 
it seems likely that most firms and states perceive Antigreenmail as a takeover “defense”, we 
treat Antigreenmail like the other defenses and code it as a decrease in shareholder rights.   37
Blank Check preferred stock is stock over which the board of directors has broad 
authority to determine voting, dividend, conversion, and other rights.  While it can be used to 
enable a company to meet changing financial needs, its most important use is to implement 
poison pills or to prevent takeover by placing this stock with friendly investors.  Because of this 
role, blank check preferred stock is a crucial part of a “delay” strategy. Companies that have this 
type of preferred stock but require shareholder approval before it can be used as a takeover 
defense are not coded as having this provision in our data. 
Business Combination  laws impose a moratorium on certain  kinds of transactions (e.g., 
asset sales, mergers) between a large shareholder and the firm, unless the transaction is approved 
by the Board of Directors.  Depending on the State, this moratorium ranges between two and five 
years after the shareholder’s stake passes a prespecified (minority) threshold.  These laws were 
in place in 25 states in 1990 and two more by 1998. It is the only state takeover law in Delaware, 
the state of incorporation for about half of our sample.   
Bylaw  and  Charter  amendment limitations limit shareholders’ ability to amend the 
governing documents of the corporation.  This might take the form of a supermajority vote 
requirement for charter or bylaw amendments, total elimination of the ability of shareholders to 
amend the bylaws, or  the ability of directors (beyond the provisions of state law) to amend the 
bylaws without shareholder approval. 
Control-share Cash-out  laws enable shareholders to sell their stakes to a “controlling” 
shareholder at a price based on the highest price of recently acquired shares.  This works 
something like fair-price provisions (see below) extended to nontakeover situations. These laws 
were in place in three states by 1990 with no additions during the decade.   38
A Classified Board (or “staggered” board) is one i n which the directors are placed into 
different classes and serve overlapping terms.  Since only part of the board can be replaced each 
year, an outsider who gains control of a corporation may have to wait a few years before being 
able to gain control of t he board.  This slow replacement makes a classified board a crucial 
component of the  Delay group of provisions, and one of the few provisions that clearly retains 
some deterrent value in modern takeover battles [Daines and Klausner 2001]. 
Compensation Plans with changes-in-control provisions allow participants in incentive 
bonus plans to cash out options or accelerate the payout of bonuses should there be a change in 
control.  The details may be a written part of the compensation agreement, or discretion may be 
given to the compensation committee. 
Director indemnification  Contracts  are contracts between the company and particular 
officers and directors indemnifying them from certain legal expenses and judgments resulting 
from lawsuits pertaining to their conduct.  Some firms have both “Indemnification” in their 
bylaws or charter and these additional indemnification “Contracts”. 
Control-share Acquisition laws (see Supermajority, below).  
Cumulative Voting allows a shareholder to allocate his total votes in any manner 
desired, where the total number of votes is the product of the number of shares owned and the 
number of directors to be elected.  By allowing them to concentrate their votes, this practice 
helps minority shareholders to elect directors.  Cumulative Voting and Secret Ballot (see below) 
are the only two provisions whose presence is coded as an increase in shareholder rights, with an 
additional point to the Governance Index if the provision is absent. 
Directors’ Duties provisions allow directors to consider constituencies other than 
shareholders when considering a merger.  These constituencies may include, for example,   39
employees, host communities, or suppliers.  This provision provides boards of directors with a 
legal basis for rejecting a takeover that would have been beneficial to shareholders.  31 states 
have  Directors’ Duties laws allowing similar expansions of constituencies, but in only two of 
these states (Indiana and Pennsylvania) are the laws explicit that the claims of shareholders 
should not be held above those of other stakeholders [Pinnell 2000].  We treat firms in these two 
states as though they had an expanded directors’ duty provision unless the firm has explicitly 
opted out of coverage under the law.   
Fair-Price provisions limit the range of prices a bidder can pay in two-tier offers.  They 
typically require a bidder to pay to all shareholders the highest price paid to any during a 
specified period of time before the commencement of a tender offer, and do not apply if the deal 
is approved by the board of directors or a supermajority of the target’s shareholders.  The goal of 
this provision is to prevent pressure on the target’s shareholders to tender their shares in the front 
end of a two-tiered tender offer, and they have the result of making such an acquisition more 
expensive.  Also, 25 states had  Fair-Price laws in place in 1990, and two more states passed 
such laws in 1991. The laws work similarly to the firm-level provisions. 
Golden Parachutes are severance agreements that provide cash and non-cash 
compensation to senior executives upon an event such as termination, demotion, or resignation 
following a change in control.  They do not require shareholder approval.  While such payments 
would appear to deter takeovers by increasing their costs, one could argue that these parachutes 
also ease the passage of mergers through contractual compensation to the managers of the target 
company [Lambert and Larcker 1985].  While the net impact on managerial entrenchment and 
shareholder wealth is ambiguous, the more important effect is the clear decrease in shareholder 
rights. In this case, the “right” is the ability of a controlling shareholder to fire management   40
without incurring an additional cost. Golden Parachutes are highly correlated with all the other 
takeover defenses.  Out of 21 pairwise correlations with the other firm-level provisions, 15 are 
positive, 10 of these positive correlations are significant, and only one of the negative 
correlations is significant.
   Thus, we treat Golden Parachutes as a restriction of shareholder 
rights.
  
Director  Indemnification uses the bylaws, charter, or both to indemnify officers and 
directors from certain legal expenses and judgments resulting from lawsuits pertaining to their 
conduct.  Some firms have both this “Indemnification” in their bylaws or charter and additional 
indemnification “Contracts”.  The cost of such protection can be used as a market measure of the 
quality of corporate governance [Core 1997 and 2000]. 
Limitations on director  Liability are charter amendments that limit directors’ personal 
liability to the extent allowed by state law.  They often eliminate personal liability for breaches 
of the duty of care, but not for breaches of the duty of loyalty or for acts of intentional 
misconduct or knowing violation of the law. 
Pension Parachutes prevent an acquirer from using surplus cash in the pension fund of 
the target to finance an acquisition.  Surplus funds are required to remain the property of the 
pension fund and to be used for plan participants’ benefits. 
Poison Pills provide their holders with special rights in the case of a triggering event 
such as a hostile takeover bid.  If a deal is approved by the board of directors, the poison pill can 
be revoked, but if the deal is not approved and the bidder proceeds, the pill is triggered.  Typical 
poison pills give the holders of the target’s stock other than the bidder the right to purchase stock 
in the target or the bidder’s company at a steep discount, making the target unattractive or 
diluting the acquirer’s voting power.  Poison pills are a crucial component of the “delay” strategy   41
at the core of modern defensive tactics.  Nevertheless, we do not include poison pills in the 
Delay group of provisions, but include it in the Other group because the pill itself can be passed 
on less than one-day’s notice, so it need not be in place for the other Delay provisions to be 
effective.  The other provisions in this group require a shareholder vote, so they cannot be passed 
on short notice. See Coates [2000] and Daines and Klausner [2001] for a discussion of this point.   
Under a  Secret Ballot (also called confidential voting), either an independent third party 
or employees sworn to secrecy are used to count proxy votes, and the management usually 
agrees not to look at individual proxy cards.  This can help eliminate potential conflicts of 
interest for fiduciaries voting shares on behalf of others, and can reduce pressure by management 
on shareholder-employees or shareholder-partners.  Cumulative Voting (see above) and Secret 
Ballots are the only two provisions whose presence is coded as an increase in shareholder rights, 
with an additional point to the Governance Index if the provision is absent. 
Executive  Severance agreements assure high-level executives of their positions or some 
compensation and are not contingent upon a change in control (unlike Golden or Silver 
parachutes). 
Silver Parachutes are similar to Golden Parachutes in that they provide severance 
payments upon a change in corporate control, but differ in that a large number of a firm’s 
employees are eligible for these benefits.  Since Silver Parachutes do not protect the key decision 
makers in a merger, we classified them in the Other group rather than in the Protection group. 
Special Meeting limitations either increase the level of shareholder support required to 
call a special meeting beyond that specified by state law or eliminate the ability to call one 
entirely.  Such provisions add extra time to proxy fights, since bidders must wait until the 
regularly scheduled annual meeting to replace board members or dismantle takeover defenses.    42
This delay is especially potent when combined with limitations on actions by written consent 
(see below).   
Supermajority requirements for approval of mergers are charter provisions that establish 
voting requirements for mergers or other business combinations that are higher than the 
threshold requirements of state law.  They are typically 66.7, 75, or 85 percent, and often exceed 
attendance at the annual meeting. In p ractice, these provisions are similar to  Control-Share 
Acquisition laws.  These laws require a majority of disinterested shareholders to vote on 
whether a newly qualifying large shareholder has voting rights.  They were in place in 25 states 
by September 1990 and one additional state in 1991. 
Unequal Voting rights limit the voting rights of some shareholders and expand those of 
others.  Under time-phased voting, shareholders who have held the stock for a given period of 
time are given more votes per share t han recent purchasers.  Another variety is the substantial-
shareholder provision, which limits the voting power of shareholders who have exceeded a 
certain threshold of ownership.  
Limitations on action by  Written Consent can take the form of the establishment of 
majority thresholds beyond the level of state law, the requirement of unanimous consent, or the 
elimination of the right to take action by written consent. Such requirements add extra time to 
many proxy fights, since bidders must wait until the regularly scheduled annual meeting to 
replace board members or dismantle takeover defenses.  This delay is especially potent when 
combined with limitations for calling special meetings (see above).     43
Appendix B – Definitions for the Regression Variables 
This list includes all variables used as regressors or for summary statistics in Tables V 
and XIII. All components are drawn from the CRSP monthly files and all variables are in natural 
logs unless explicitly noted otherwise.  Variables are listed in alphabetical order. 
 
BM - The ratio of book value of common equity (previous fiscal year) to market value of 
common equity (end of previous calendar year).  Book value of common equity is the sum of 
book common equity (Compustat item 60) and deferred taxes (Compustat item 74).  This 
variable, and all other variables that use Compustat data, are recalculated each July and held 
constant through the following June. 
5-Year Return – The compounded return from month t-61 to month t-2.  
IO  – Shares held by institutions divided by total shares outstanding (not in logs).  
Institutional holdings are from SEC Form 13F quarterly filings, as provided by Thomson 
Financial.  We use the most recent quarter as of the end of month t-1, with shares outstanding 
(from CRSP) measured on the same date. 
NADVOL  - The dollar volume of trading in month t -2 for stocks that trade on the 
Nasdaq.  Approximated as stock price at the end of month t -2 multiplied by share volume in 
month t -2.  For New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
stocks, NADVOL equals zero. 
NASDUM  - A dummy variable equal to one if the firm traded on the Nasdaq Stock 
Market at the beginning of month t and zero otherwise.   44
NYDVOL - The dollar volume of trading in month t-2 for stocks that trade on the NYSE 
or AMEX.  Approximated as stock price at the end of month t-2 multiplied by share volume in 
month t-2.  For Nasdaq stocks, NYDVOL equals zero. 
PRICE - Price at the end of month t-2. 
Q  - The market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (Compustat item 6), 
where the market value of assets is computed as book value of assets plus the market value of 
common stock less the sum of the book value of common stock (Compustat item 60) and balance 
sheet deferred taxes (Compustat item 74).  All book values for fiscal year t (from Compustat) are 
combined with the market value of common equity at the calendar end of year t. 
RET2-3 - Compounded gross returns for months t-3 and t-2. 
RET4-6 - Compounded gross returns for months t-6 through t-4. 
RET7-12 - Compounded gross returns for months t-12 through t-7. 
SGROWTH  - The growth in sales (Compustat item 12) over the previous five fiscal 
years (not in logs). 
SIZE - Market capitalization in millions of dollars at the end of month t-2. 
SP500 - membership in the S&P 500 as of the end of month t-1.  Value is equal to one if 
the firm is in the index, and zero otherwise. Data is from CRSP S&P 500 constituent file. 
VOLUME - The dollar volume of trading in month t-2 =  NADVOL + NYDVOL. 
 
YLD  - The ratio of dividends in the previous fiscal year (Compustat item 21) to market 
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TABLE I 
Governance Provisions 
This table presents the percentage of firms with each provision between 1990 and 1998.  The 
data are drawn from the IRRC Corporate Takeover Defenses publications [Rosenbaum 1990, 
1993, 1995, and 1998] and are supplemented by data on state takeover legislation coded from 
Pinnell [2000].  See Appendix A for detailed information on each of these provisions.  The 
sample consists of all firms in the IRRC research universe except those with dual class stock.   
  Percentage of firms with 
governance provisions in 
  1990  1993  1995  1998 
Delay         
  Blank Check  76.4  80.0  85.7  87.9 
  Classified Board  59.0  60.4  61.7  59.4 
  Special Meeting  24.5  29.9  31.9  34.5 
  Written Consent  24.4  29.2  32.0  33.1 
Protection         
  Compensation Plans  44.7  65.8  72.5  62.4 
  Contracts   16.4  15.2  12.7  11.7 
  Golden Parachutes  53.1  55.5  55.1  56.6 
  Indemnification  40.9  39.6  38.7  24.4 
  Liability  72.3  69.1  65.6  46.8 
  Severance   13.4  5.5  10.3  11.7 
Voting         
  Bylaws  14.4  16.1  16.0  18.1 
  Charter  3.2  3.4  3.1  3.0 
  Cumulative Voting  18.5  16.5  14.9  12.2 
  Secret Ballot  2.9  9.5  12.2  9.4 
  Supermajority  38.8  39.6  38.5  34.1 
  Unequal Voting  2.4  2.0  1.9  1.9 
Other         
  Antigreenmail  6.1  6.9  6.4  5.6 
  Directors’ Duties  6.5  7.4  7.2  6.7 
  Fair Price  33.5  35.2  33.6  27.8 
  Pension Parachutes  3.9  5.2  3.9  2.2 
  Poison Pill  53.9  57.4  56.6  55.3 
  Silver Parachutes  4.1  4.8  3.5  2.3 
State         
  Antigreenmail Law  17.2  17.6  17.0  14.1 
  Business Combination Law  84.3  88.5  88.9  89.9 
  Cash-Out Law  4.2  3.9  3.9  3.5 
  Directors’ Duties Law  5.2  5.0  5.0  4.4 
  Fair Price Law  35.7  36.9  35.9  31.6 
  Control Share Acquisition Law  29.6  29.9  29.4  26.4 
Number of Firms  1357  1343  1373  1708 
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TABLE II 
The Governance Index 
This table provides summary statistics on the distribution of  G, the Governance Index, and the 
subindices (Delay, Protection, Voting, Other, and State) over time.  G and the subindices are 
calculated from the provisions listed in Table I as described in Section II.  Appendix A gives 
detailed information on each provision.  We divide the sample into ten portfolios based on the 
level of  G  and list the number of firms in each portfolio.  The Democracy Portfolio is 
composed of all firms where  G£5, and the Dictatorship Portfolio contains all firms where 
G‡14. 
  1990  1993  1995  1998 
Governance Index         
  Minimum  2  2  2  2 
  Mean  9.0  9.3  9.4  8.9 
  Median  9  9  9  9 
  Mode  10  9  9  10 
  Maximum  17  17  17  18 
  Standard Deviation  2.9  2.8  2.8  2.8 
Number of Firms         
  G£5 (Democracy Portfolio)  158  139  120  215 
  G=6  119  88  108  169 
  G=7  158  140  127  186 
  G=8  165  139  152  201 
  G=9  160  183  183  197 
  G=10  175  170  178  221 
  G=11  149  168  166  194 
  G=12  104  123  142  136 
  G=13  84  100  110  106 
  G‡14 (Dictatorship Portfolio)   85  93  87  83 
  Total  1357  1343  1373  1708 
Subindex Means         
  Delay  1.8  2.0  2.1  2.1 
  Protection  2.4  2.5  2.5  2.1 
  Voting  2.2  2.1  2.1  2.2 
  Other  1.1  1.2  1.1  1.0 
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TABLE III 
Correlations between the Subindices  
This table presents pairwise correlations between the subindices,  Delay, Protection, Voting, 
Other,  and State in 1990.  The calculation of the subindices is described in Section II.  The 
elements of each subindex are given in Table I and described in detail in Appendix A.  
Significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** respectively.    
  Delay  Protection  Voting  Other 
Protection     0.22**       
Voting    0.33**     0.10**     
Other    0.43**     0.27**     0.19**   
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TABLE IV 
The Largest Firms in the Extreme Portfolios  
This table presents the firms with the largest market capitalizations at the end of 1990 of all 
companies within the Democracy Portfolio ( G£5) and the Dictatorship Portfolio (G‡14).  The 
calculation of  G is described in Section II.  The companies are listed in descending order of 
market capitalization.  
1990 Democracy Portfolio 






IBM   New York  5  6 
Wal-Mart  Delaware  5  5 
Du Pont de Nemours  Delaware  5  5 
Pepsico  North Carolina  4  3 
American International Group  Delaware  5  5 
Southern Company  Delaware  5  5 
Hewlett Packard   California  5  6 
Berkshire Hathaway  Delaware  3  - 
Commonwealth Edison  Illinois  4  6 
Texas Utilities  Texas  2  4 
 
1990 Dictatorship Portfolio 






GTE  New York  14  13 
Waste Management  Delaware  15  13 
General Re  Delaware  14  16 
Limited Inc  Delaware  14  14 
NCR  Maryland  14  - 
K Mart  Michigan  14  10 
United Telecommunications  Kansas  14  - 
Time Warner  Delaware  14  13 
Rorer  Pennsylvania  16  - 
Woolworth  New York  14  13 
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TABLE V 
Summary Statistics 
This table gives descriptive statistics for the relationship of  G with several financial and 
accounting measures in September 1990.  The first column gives the correlations for each of these 
variables with the Governance Index,  G.  The second and third columns give means for these 
same variables within the Democracy Portfolio ( G£5) and the Dictatorship Portfolio ( G‡14) in 
1990.  The final column gives the difference of the two means with its standard error in 
parentheses.  The calculation of  G  is described in Section II, and definitions of each variable are 
given in Appendix B.  Significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * 
and ** respectively.   








BM  0.02              -0.66             -0.54        -0.12 
(0.10) 
SIZE     0.15**  12.86  13.46    -0.60** 
(0.21) 
PRICE     0.16**   2.74   3.14    -0.40** 
(0.12) 
VOLUME     0.19**  16.34  17.29    -0.95** 
(0.24) 
Q          -0.04 
 
 1.77   1.47   0.30* 
(0.14) 
YLD  0.03     4.20%    7.20%   -3.00% 
(4.34) 








 -0.08**  62.74%  44.78%   17.96% 
(9.83) 
IO    0.14**  25.89%  34.44%     -8.55%* 
(3.36) 
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TABLE VI 
Performance-Attribution Regressions for Decile Portfolios 
We estimate four-factor regressions (equation (1) from the text) of value-weighted monthly 
returns for portfolios of firms sorted by  G.  The calculation of  G is described in Section II.  
The first row contains the results when we use the portfolio that buys the Democracy 
Portfolio ( G£5) and sells short the Dictatorship Portfolio (G‡14).  The portfolios are reset in 
September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 1998, which are the months after new 
data on  G  became available.  The explanatory variables are  RMRF,  SMB,  HML, and 
Momentum.  These variables are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture 
market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, respectively.  (Consult Fama and 
French [1993] and Carhart [1997] on the construction of these factors.)  The sample period is 
from September 1990 through December 1999.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
and significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** 
respectively. 














Democracy-Dictatorship      0.71** 
(0.26) 




  -0.55** 
(0.10) 






   0.98** 
(0.04) 
  -0.24** 
(0.05) 
  -0.21** 
(0.05) 
    -0.05 
(0.03) 
G=6  0.22 
(0.18) 
   0.99** 
(0.05) 










   1.05** 
(0.05) 
   -0.10 
(0.07) 
 
  -0.14 
(0.08) 
 
   0.15** 
(0.05) 
  G=8  0.08 
(0.14) 
   1.02** 
(0.04) 
   -0.04 
(0.05) 






   -0.02 
(0.12) 
   0.97** 
(0.03) 
  -0.20** 
(0.04) 
   0.14** 
(0.05) 
 
    -0.01 
(0.03) 
  G=10  0.03 
(0.11) 
   0.95** 
(0.03) 
  -0.17** 
(0.04) 
  -0.00 
(0.04) 
  -0.08** 
(0.03) 
G=11  0.18 
(0.16) 




  -0.06 
(0.06) 
    -0.01 
(0.04) 
G=12     -0.25 
(0.14) 








G=13     -0.01 
(0.14) 
   1.03** 
(0.04) 






G‡14 (Dictatorship)  -0.42* 
(0.19) 
   1.03** 
(0.05) 
   -0.02 
(0.06) 
   0.34** 
(0.07) 
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TABLE VII 
Performance-Attribution Regressions under Alternative Portfolio Constructions 
This table presents the alphas from four-factor regressions for variations on the Democracy (G£5) 
minus Dictatorship  (G‡14) Portfolio.  The calculation of  G  is described in Section II.  The 
portfolios are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 1998, which are the 
months after new data on  G became available.  The sample period is September 1990 to 
December 1999.  The first row uses the unadjusted difference between the monthly returns to the 
Democracy and Dictatorship Portfolios.  The second row contains the results using industry-
adjusted returns, with industry adjustments done relative to the 48 industries of Fama and French 
[1997].  The third and fourth rows use alternative definitions of the Democracy and Dictatorship 
Portfolios.  In the third row, firms are sorted on  G and the two portfolios contain the smallest set 
of firms with extreme values of  G such that each has at least 10 percent of the sample.  This 
implies cutoff values of  G for the Democracy Portfolio of 5, 5, 6, and 5 for September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, and February 1998, respectively.  The cutoffs for the Dictatorship Portfolio are 
always 13.  In the fourth row, the two portfolios contain the largest set of firms such that each has 
no more than 10 percent of the sample.  The cutoff values of G for the Democracy Portfolio are 4, 
4, 5, and 4 for September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 1998, respectively, and they 
are always 14 for the Dictatorship Portfolio.  In the fifth row, portfolio returns are calculated 
maintaining the 1990 portfolios for the entire sample period.  As long as they are listed in CRSP, 
we neither delete nor add firms to these portfolios regardless of subsequent changes in  G or 
changes in the IRRC sample in later editions.  The sixth row shows the results of restricting the 
sample to firms incorporated in Delaware.  In the seventh and eighth rows, the sample period is 
divided in half at April 30, 1995, and separate regressions are estimated for the first half and 
second half of the period (56 months each).  The explanatory variables are RMRF, SMB, HML, 
Momentum, and a constant.  These variables are the returns to zero-investment portfolios 
designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, respectively.  (Consult 
Fama and French [1993] and Carhart [1997] on the construction of these factors.)  All coefficients 
except for the alpha are omitted in this table.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses and 
significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** respectively.   
  a, Value-Weighted  a, Equal-Weighted 




























(8)  Late Half  0.75 
 (0.40) 
0.04 
(0.27)   58
TABLE VIII 
Q Regressions 
The first column of this table presents the coefficients on G, the Governance Index, from regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin's Q on G and control variables.  The 
second column restricts the sample to firms in the Democracy ( G£5)  and Dictatorship ( G‡14) portfolios and includes as regressors a dummy variable for the 
Democracy Portfolio and the controls.  The third through seventh columns show the coefficients on each subindex from regressions where the explanatory variables are 
the subindices Delay, Protection, Voting, Other, and State, and the controls.  We include as controls a dummy variable for incorporation in Delaware, the log of assets 
in the current fiscal year, the log of firm age measured in months as of December of each year, and a dummy variable for inclusion in the S&P 500 as of the end of the 
previous year.  The coefficients on the controls and the constant are omitted from the table.  The calculation of G and the subindices is described in Section II.  Q is the 
ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets:  the market value is calculated as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common 
stock less the book value of common stock and deferred taxes.  The market value of equity is measured at the end of the current calendar year, and the accounting 
variables are measured in the current fiscal year.  Industry adjustments are made by subtracting the industry median, where medians are calculated by matching the 
four-digit SIC codes from December of each year to the 48 industries designated by Fama and French [1997].  The coefficients and standard errors from each annual 
cross-sectional regression are reported in each row, and the time-series averages and time-series standard errors are given in the last row.  * and ** indicate significance 
at the five-percent and one-percent levels respectively.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  G  Democracy Portfolio  Delay  Protection  Voting  Other  State 




     -0.015 
(0.022) 




     -0.031 
(0.026) 
     -0.004 
(0.020) 




     -0.033 
(0.034) 
     -0.048 
(0.028) 
     -0.012 
(0.047) 








     -0.041 
(0.027) 




     -0.054 
(0.032) 
     -0.011 
(0.025) 


















     -0.032 
(0.023) 
     -0.012 
(0.020) 
     -0.032 
(0.031) 
















     -0.022 
(0.028) 




     -0.029 
(0.031) 
     -0.030 
(0.028) 




     -0.024 
(0.028) 




     -0.017 
(0.035) 
     -0.007 
(0.032) 
     -0.055 
(0.047) 
     -0.001 
(0.042) 
     -0.017 
(0.032) 








     -0.132 
(0.070) 




1999    -0.114** 
(0.027) 
            0.564 
(0.602) 






     -0.006 
(0.090) 
     -0.033 
(0.073) 
Mean    -0.043** 
(0.009) 
   0.336** 
(0.040) 













The first, third, and fifth columns of this table give the results of annual median (least absolute 
deviation) regressions for net profit margin, return on equity, and sales growth on t he 
Governance Index,  G, measured in the previous year, and the book-to-market ratio, BM.  The 
second, fourth, and sixth columns restrict the sample to firms in the Democracy ( G£5)  and 
Dictatorship ( G‡14) portfolios and include as regressors a dummy variable for the Democracy 
Portfolio and  BM.  The coefficients on  BM and the constant are omitted from the table.  The 
calculation of  G is described in Section II.  Net profit margin is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items available for common equity to sales; return on equity is the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items available for common equity to the sum of the book value of 
common equity and deferred taxes;  BM is the log of the ratio of book value (the sum of book 
common equity and deferred taxes) in the previous fiscal year to size at the close of the previous 
calendar year.  Each dependent variable is net of the industry median, which is calculated by 
matching the four-digit SIC codes of all firms in the CRSP-Compustat merged database in 
December of each year to the 48 industries designated by Fama and French [1997].  The 
coefficients and standard errors from each annual cross-sectional regression are reported in each 
row, and the time-series averages and time-series standard errors are given  in the last row.  
Significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** respectively.  All 
coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 1000. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Net Profit Margin  Return on Equity  Sales Growth 
  G  Democracy 
Portfolio 
G  Democracy 
Portfolio 
G  Democracy 
Portfolio 
1991    -0.70 
(0.39) 










1992    -0.52 
(0.58) 






















1994    -0.83 
(0.48) 
     10.94 
(6.59) 












   -1.39 
(0.75) 
     14.77 
(9.88) 




1996    -0.43 
(0.40) 










1997  0.21 
(0.55) 










1998    -0.73 
(0.63) 
     -3.99 
(7.15) 




  -1.45 
(1.50) 
    -15.65 
(23.36) 






     -15.53 
(10.38) 












  -1.68** 
(0.37) 
5.10 




The first and third columns of this table present the results of annual median (least absolute 
deviation) regressions of CAPEX/Assets and CAPEX/Sales on the Governance Index,  G, 
measured in the previous year, and BM.  The second and fourth columns restrict the sample to 
firms in the Democracy ( G£5)  and Dictatorship ( G‡14) portfolios and include as regressors a 
dummy variable for the Democracy Portfolio and  BM.  The coefficients on  BM and the 
constant are omitted from the table.  The calculation of  G is described in Section II.  CAPEX 
is capital expenditures, and BM is the log of the ratio of book value (the sum of book common 
equity and deferred taxes) in the previous fiscal year to size at the close of the previous 
calendar year.  Both dependent variables are net of the industry median, which is calculated by 
matching the four-digit SIC codes of all firms in the CRSP-Compustat merged database in 
December of each year to the 48 industries designated by Fama and French [1997].  The 
coefficients and standard errors from each annual cross-sectional regression are reported in 
each row, and the time-series averages and time-series standard errors are given in the last 
row.  Significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and * * 
respectively.  All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 1000. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  CAPEX/Assets  CAPEX/Sales 
  G  Democracy 
Portfolio 
G  Democracy 
Portfolio 






        -9.28 
(4.96) 
1992  0.42 
(0.35) 




        -7.23 
(6.01) 
1993    0.81* 
(0.37) 




        -1.68 
(4.98) 
1994  0.51 
(0.32) 
        -7.84 
(5.21) 
        -0.07 
(0.37) 
        -4.82 
(4.76) 
1995  0.35 
(0.39) 




        -9.80 
(5.90) 
1996  0.75 
(0.39) 




        -3.26 
(6.36) 
1997   0.74* 
(0.34) 




        -8.05 
(5.71) 
1998   0.80* 
(0.37) 




        -6.43 
(5.63) 








Mean     0.62** 
(0.13) 
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TABLE XI 
Acquisitions 
The first column of this table presents annual Tobit regressions of the  Acquisition Ratio on the 
Governance Index, G, measured in the previous year, SIZE, BM, and industry dummy variables.  The 
third column presents annual Poisson regressions of  Acquisition Count on the same explanatory 
variables.  In the second and fourth columns, we restrict the sample to firms in the Democracy (G£5) 
and Dictatorship ( G‡14) portfolios,  and we include as a regressor a dummy variable that equals 1 
when the firm is in the Democracy Portfolio and 0 otherwise.  The coefficients on SIZE, BM, and the 
industry dummy variables are omitted from the table.  The calculation of  G is described in Section 
II.  Acquisition Ratio is defined as the sum of the value of all corporate acquisitions during a 
calendar year scaled by the average of market value at the beginning and end o f the year.  
Acquisition Count is defined as the number of acquisitions during a calendar year.    The data on 
acquisitions are from the SDC database.  SIZE is the log of market capitalization at the end of the 
previous calendar year in millions of dollars, and BM is the log of the ratio of book value (the sum of 
book common equity and deferred taxes) in the previous fiscal year to size at the close of the 
previous calendar year.  Industry dummy variables are created by matching the four-digit SIC codes 
of all firms in the CRSP-Compustat merged database in December of each year to the 48 industries 
designated by Fama and French [1997].  The coefficients and standard errors from each annual 
cross-sectional regression are reported in each row, and the time-series averages and time-series 
standard errors are given in the last row.  Significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is 
indicated by * and ** respectively.  All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 












1991    1.58 
(1.46) 






1992  1.64 
(1.44) 






1993  1.75 
(1.42) 




        -6.31 
(6.85) 
1994    4.09** 
(1.27) 






1995   2.57* 
(1.15) 




        -2.95 
(4.42) 
1996   2.69* 
(1.14) 






1997   2.34* 
(1.12) 




        -9.24 
(6.78) 
1998   2.42* 
(1.09) 




      -11.11 
(8.51) 
1999  0.52 
(1.01) 




       -20.87* 
(9.68) 




   0.79** 
(0.14) 
        -7.21 




The first and third columns of this table present annual OLS and ordered logit regressions of  Net 
Insider Purchases on  G measured in the previous year, SIZE, BM, and a constant.  In the second 
and fourth columns, we restrict the sample to firms in the Democracy ( G£5) and Dictatorship 
(G‡14) portfolios and we include as a regressor a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm is in 
the Democracy Portfolio  and 0 otherwise.  The coefficients on  SIZE,  BM, and the constant  are 
omitted from the table.  The calculation of  G is described in Section II.  Net Insider Purchases is 
the sum of split-adjusted open market purchases less split-adjusted open market sales during a year 
scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the previous calendar year.  The ordered logit regressions 
use a dependent variable that equals 1 if Net Insider Purchases is positive, 0 if it is zero, and -1 if it 
is negative.  The data on insider sales is from the Thomson database.  SIZE is the log of market 
capitalization in millions of dollars measured at the end of the previous calendar year, and  BM is 
the log of the ratio of book value (the sum of book common equity and deferred taxes) in the 
previous fiscal y ear to size at the close of the previous calendar year.  The coefficients and standard 
errors from each annual cross-sectional regression are reported in each row, and the time-series 
averages and time-series standard errors are given in the last row.  Significance at the five-percent 
and one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** respectively.  All coefficients and standard errors 
are multiplied by 1000. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  Ordered Logit 








1991   0.07* 
(0.04) 




      -345.18 
(295.15) 
1992  0.10 
(0.07) 






1993  0.10 
(0.07) 
          -0.23 
0.51 




1994  0.07 
(0.04) 
          -0.61 
(1.23) 




1995  0.04 
(0.02) 




      -153.33 
(308.90) 
1996  0.15 
(0.14) 






















1999  0.36 
(0.48) 




      -117.36 
(323.85) 
Mean  0.09 
(0.04) 
          -0.15 
(0.40) 
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TABLE XIII 
Fama-MacBeth Return Regressions 
This table presents the average coefficients and time-series standard errors for 112 cross-
sectional regressions for each month from September 1990 to December 1999.  The dependent 
variable is the stock return for month  t.  The results are presented using both raw and industry-
adjusted returns, with industry adjustments done using the 48 industries of Fama and French 
[1997].  The first and second columns include all firms with data for all right-hand side 
variables and use G, the Governance Index, as an independent variable.  In the third and fourth 
columns, the sample is restricted to firms in either the Democracy ( G£5) or Dictatorship 
(G‡14) portfolios, and we use the independent variable,  Democracy Portfolio, a dummy 
variable that equals 1 when the firm is in the Democracy Portfolio and 0 otherwise.  In the fifth 
and sixth columns, we again include all firms with data for each explanatory variable and use 
the subindices, Delay, Protection, Voting, Other, and State as regressors.  The calculation of G 
and the subindices is described in Section II.  Definitions for all other explanatory variables are 
provided in Appendix B.  All regressions are estimated with weighted least squares where all 
variables are weighted by market v alue at the end of month  t-1.  Significance at the five-
percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** respectively.   64
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G     -0.04 
(0.04) 
   -0.02 
(0.03) 
       
Democracy 
  Portfolio 




   




Protection             -0.07 
(0.08) 
   -0.01 
(0.06) 
Voting             -0.08 
(0.13) 
   -0.08 
(0.10) 
Other          0.01 
(0.08) 
   -0.04 
(0.07) 
State          0.02 
(0.08) 
   -0.04 
(0.06) 
NASDUM     -0.83 
(6.94) 
   -0.42 
(5.26) 
   -8.23 
(6.45) 
  -10.36 
(5.94) 
   -2.60 
(6.39) 
   -0.29 
(4.98) 
SP500     -0.19 
(0.49) 
   -0.20 
(0.42) 
   -0.42 
(0.49) 
   -0.21 
(0.41) 
   -0.19 
(0.45) 
   -0.24 
(0.40) 
















































NYDVOL     -0.11 
(0.29) 
   -0.21 
(0.18) 
   -0.49 
(0.36) 
   -0.03 
(0.31) 
   -0.13 
(0.28) 
   -0.21 
(0.18) 
NADVOL  0.01 
(0.43) 
   -0.13 
(0.29) 






   -0.15 
(0.29) 












RET2-3     -0.48 
(1.40) 
   -0.93 
(1.04) 
   -2.04 
(2.33) 
   -1.82 
(1.73) 
   -0.57 
(1.43) 
   -1.03 
(1.07) 
RET4-6     -0.68 
(1.33) 
   -0.48 
(0.92) 
   -2.21 
(1.89) 
   -1.12 
(1.36) 
   -0.58 
(1.33) 
   -0.55 
(0.93) 






   -1.67 
(1.03) 
















Constant     -0.53 
(2.55) 








   -0.16 
(1.69) 
  